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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to present a solution to a problem that arises from the fact 
that people who commit crimes under the influence of serious mental disorders may 
still have a capacity to refuse treatment. Several ethicists have argued that the pre-
sent legislation concerning involuntary treatment of people with mental disorder is 
discriminatory and should change to the effect that psychiatric patients can refuse 
care on the same grounds as patients in somatic care. However, people with mental 
disorders who have committed crimes and been exempted from criminal responsi-
bility would then fall outside the scope of criminal justice as well as that of the psy-
chiatric institutions if they were to refuse care. In this paper, I present and develop a 
solution to how society should deal with this group of people, called Advance crimi-
nal responsibility. The basic idea being that if a person with a potentially respon-
sibility exempting psychiatric condition refuses care,  that person is responsible for 
any future criminal acts which are due to the mental disorder.
Keywords Autonomy · Criminal responsibility · Mental disorder · Involuntary 
treatment · Insanity defence · Decision-making capacity
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present a solution to a problem that arises in the situa-
tion when people who commit crimes under the influence of serious mental disor-
ders have the capacity to refuse treatment. Presently, if a person commits a crime 
under the influence of a mental disorder that person can, in most jurisdictions, be 
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exempted from criminal responsibility on the grounds of legal insanity. In such 
cases, the excused person will likely be subjected to involuntary psychiatric treat-
ment. The consequence may thus be that, while one and the same person accord-
ing to criminal law goes free from incarceration, they will be deprived of their 
liberty in accordance with mental health (administrative) law.
Over the last twenty years, ethicists (e.g., Doyal and Sheather 2005; Richard-
son 2002; Sjöstrand and Helgesson 2008; Szmukler 2017; Szmukler and Hollo-
way 2000; Tännsjö 1999) have argued that the legislation regulating the involun-
tary treatment of people who suffer from mental disorders is discriminatory. The 
principles generally applied to involuntary psychiatric care deviate substantially 
from well-established and commonly accepted ethical principles. If the critics are 
right, some people with mental disorders are currently, unjustifiably, being sub-
ject to involuntary treatment.
If the legislation regarding involuntary treatment of people with mental dis-
orders were to change in accordance with the critics’ suggestion, we could, as I 
will discuss in further detail below, face a situation in which an offender who has 
committed a crime under the influence of a serious mental disorder is exempted 
from criminal punishment but has a right to refuse care. Such an offender would 
thus not face any further consequences for their actions and may continue to pose 
a threat to other people.
The problem just outlined stems from a combination of the following three 
propositions:
1. Some people who commit crimes under the influence of a mental disorder should 
be exempt from criminal responsibility.
2. Some people suffering from a mental disorder have a right to refuse psychiatric 
treatment.
3. Some people suffering from a mental disorder pose a threat to other people.
The first two propositions are underpinned by ethical principles regulating how 
people with mental disorders should be treated by the health care and criminal 
justice institutions respectively. I will argue that the ethical principles underly-
ing both 1 and 2 are sound but become problematic in the case of potentially 
dangerous people (proposition 3). I will propose a re-examination of these princi-
ples, particularly the ones pertaining to criminal responsibility; a re-examination 
which will show us a way out of this dilemma. The solution I am proposing will 
be referred to as Advance criminal responsibility. This special version of criminal 
responsibility entails that if a person suffers from a condition that might under-
mine criminal responsibility but has a right to refuse care that would mitigate the 
condition and uses that right, that person becomes criminally responsible for any 
criminal acts conducted at a later point due to their (previous) refusal of care. 
This suggestion is dependent on society providing adequate care and support for 
all people who suffer from such mental disorders. Further, it carries the implica-
tion that an offender without a previous history of mental disorder who subse-
quently has had no opportunity to refuse or consent to care, but who commits a 
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crime under the influence of that disorder, will continue to be exempt from crimi-
nal responsibility.
Offenders suffering from mental disorders exist at the intersection of two insti-
tutions: that of criminal justice and that of health care. A discussion of how this 
particular group of offenders ought to be treated needs to involve an examination 
of the ethical principles guiding both institutions, especially the ones pertaining to 
the conditions regulating the rights of these institutions to deprive people of their 
liberty. These ethical principles also justify the first two propositions of the problem 
described above.
I will address each of the ethical principles in turn: in section two, I describe 
two versions of the insanity defence and discuss how it is justified in the light of 
the major normative theories of criminal punishment. In the third section, I discuss 
the standard legal arrangement concerning the involuntary treatment of people with 
mental disorders and how it ought to change. In the fourth section, I discuss the 
group of offenders that suffer from mental disorders and pose a threat to other peo-
ple as well as suggestions discussed by critics of the present-day order. Finally, in 
the fifth section, I present the Advance criminal responsibility model and defend it.
2  Criminal Responsibility and the Insanity Defence
Most jurisdictions include some form of exemption from criminal responsibility for 
people suffering from mental disorders (Simon and Ahn-Redding 2008). The precise 
conditions for such exemptions vary between jurisdictions and the discussion here 
will only focus on two of them. In its most common version, the exemption from 
criminal responsibility focuses on the person’s knowledge of the act. Roughly, if a 
person as a consequence of a serious mental condition is judged to lack the ability to 
appreciate the nature of the act (or that it is wrong) then that person is to be exempt 
from criminal responsibility.1
By criminal responsibility I refer to an institutional concept of responsibility. That 
is, a person is criminally responsible if the criminal justice institution, in a specific 
jurisdiction, considers that person an appropriate target of criminal sanctions. This 
can be contrasted with the notion of moral responsibility, a preinstitutional concept 
that, according to most theories of criminal punishment, should inform what falls 
under the concept of criminal responsibility.
The most well-known and discussed version of the insanity defence is the 
M’Naghten rule. This rule is named after Daniel M’Naghten who murdered Edward 
Drummond in the belief that he was Robert Peel, the British prime minister of the 
time. M’Naghten suffered from the delusion that Prime Minister Peel was part of a 
1 It is notable that even a country like Sweden, which does not exempt people suffering from mental 
disorders from criminal responsibility, treats this group of offenders differently. If someone is found to 
have committed a crime under the influence of a serious mental disorder, then such a person may not be 
sentenced to prison but may instead be sentenced to forensic psychiatric care. In the Swedish system, 
the offender is thus not exempted from criminal responsibility but from a prison sanction (Dahlin et al. 
2009).
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conspiracy aimed at him. M’Naghten was later freed from criminal responsibility on 
the grounds of insanity. This ruling later led to the formulation of the M’Naghten 
rule by the House of Lords. According to this rule a person is not responsible for 
having committed a criminal act if “at the time of committing of the act, the party 
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing: or, if he did know ‘it’, 
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong” (M’Naghten’s case 1843).
In some versions of the legal insanity rules, volitional control also plays a role. 
As an example, the Model Penal Code, used in several states in the USA, states that 
a person is exempt from criminal responsibility “if at the time of such conduct as 
a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law” (Model Penal Code and Commentaries 1985).
2.1  The Normative Basis of the Insanity Defence
The basis of the legal insanity defence is the idea that only those who are morally 
responsible for a crime—those who are guilty of it—deserve punishment. This prin-
ciple is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system and is usually linked to the the-
ory of retributivism (Duus-Otterström 2007). Retributivism exists in many varieties, 
but at the heart of all retributive theories lies the idea that an offender deserves to be 
punished in proportion to the wrongfulness of the act. This wrongfulness of the act 
is, in turn, understood in terms of the severity of the deed and the degree to which 
the offender is morally responsible for the crime (Walen 2014).
Other theories, such as communicative theories (e.g. Duff 2001), share the idea 
that criminal responsibility should be modelled on moral responsibility. This can 
be contrasted with consequentialist theories such as the general deterrence theory, 
which states that a person should be considered criminally responsible if doing so 
contributes to fewer crimes being committed. The notion of criminal responsibility 
here is derived not from beliefs about moral responsibility but from other ethical 
considerations. However, advocates of the general deterrence theory usually argue 
that the criminal attributions of this theory would approximate those of a retributive 
theory (e.g. Clark 1997; Hart 2008; Rawls 1955).2 The same pattern usually mirrors 
other consequentialist theories of punishment: if only for pragmatic reasons, they 
allow the inclusion of some variant of the basic idea that only those guilty of a crime 
should be subjected to criminal punishment. This means that consequentialist theo-
ries, too, support having some variant of an insanity defence.
2 There are also other theories, such as negative retributivism, for which the notion of criminal responsi-
bility is the result of both moral responsibility and other considerations. For example, Tadros (2011) has 
argued in favour of a theory according to which society is permitted to punish someone who is morally 
responsible for having committed a crime but should only do so if such a punishment contributes to pre-
venting further crimes.
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3  Involuntary Treatment of People with Mental Disorders
Most countries permit, under certain circumstances, people suffering from mental 
disorders to be subjected to involuntary psychiatric care. In a review of legislation 
in the EU member states concerning involuntary treatment and placement, the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) found that involuntary psychiat-
ric care was allowed, although the specific conditions varied: all countries required 
the presence of a mental disorder and almost all countries required the person suf-
fering from a mental disorder to pose a threat either to themselves or to others (FRA 
2012; cf. Dressing and Salize 2004).
The legal rules of the EU member states adhere to a greater or lesser extent to rec-
ommendations made by the Council of Europe (FRA 2012). According to these rec-
ommendations, the legislation for the involuntary treatment of people with mental 
disorders should meet four criteria: the person should suffer from a mental disorder; 
the person should pose a threat to himself or others; no appropriate, less restrictive 
alternative is available; and the opinion of the person has been taken into account. 
For involuntary placement, there is an additional criterion that the placement should 
have a therapeutic purpose (Council of Europe 2004).
According to the recommendation, the involuntary treatment of people with men-
tal disorders applies to those.
 i. who have the capacity to consent3 and are refusing the placement or treatment 
concerned; or
 ii. who do not have the capacity to consent and are objecting to the placement or 
treatment concerned. (Council of Europe 2004, article 16)
Article 16 is found in section III of the recommendation, which is concerned with 
involuntary psychiatric treatment and placement. This section constitutes an excep-
tion to the recommendation’s general rule that, if they have the capacity to consent, 
care should only be given to people with their consent, regardless of whether they 
have a mental disorder or not. If a person who suffers from a mental disorder does 
not have the capacity to consent then care should only be given “with the authoriza-
tion of a representative, authority, person or body provided for by the law” (Council 
of Europe 2004, article 12). The Council of Europe’s recommendation thus makes a 
distinction between the right of people with mental disorders to refuse care for their 
mental disorder and their right to refuse care for other conditions.
The Council of Europe’s recommendation and European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (ECHRB) permit involuntary treatment for mental dis-
orders whereas they do not permit involuntary treatment for somatic care. Nei-
ther document provides reasoning for why psychiatric care should be treated dif-
ferently and as such the exception constitutes a violation of article 3 in the same 
3 In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Council of Europe (2004) states that they use the term capac-
ity to consent in the same way as the ECHRB (1997) and that having the capacity to consent entails the 
capacity to refuse treatment.
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recommendation, which states that “[a]ny form of discrimination on grounds of 
mental disorder should be prohibited” (Council of Europe 2004, article 3).
Several ethicists (e.g. Doyal and Sheather 2005; Richardson 2002; Sjöstrand and 
Helgesson 2008; Szmukler 2017; Szmukler and Holloway 2000; Tännsjö 1999)4 
have drawn attention to this, in their view, unjustified discrepancy. The discrepancy 
can be described as a health care ethical objection to any act of involuntary treat-
ment of patients with the capacity to consent. But the regulatory framework for 
involuntary psychiatric treatment may also be rejected on legal grounds. Due to the 
internal inconsistency of this framework, the space created for the legal involun-
tary treatment of psychiatric patients with capacity to consent becomes a case of 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The discriminatory treatment of people with mental 
disorders is also explicitly addressed by the United Nations in its:
States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with 
others … b) [a]re not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and 
that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, and that the exist-
ence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty. (UN 2006, 
article 14)
 There are two key parts of this article: the first is that the disability in itself is not a 
ground for depriving people of their liberty and the second is that people with disa-
bilities should be treated on an equal basis with others. Both of these points seem to 
hold also for mental disorders. In order to justify involuntary psychiatric treatment 
in a way that escapes the objections, it would seem that we need to demonstrate 
either that the patient lacks capacity for informed consent, or that there is something 
else about the patient that may justify involuntary treatment in light of health care 
ethics and/or the legal framework. In the next section, I will comment on the first 
issue, and after that comment on the latter possibility.
3.1  Capacity for Informed Consent and Refusal of Treatment
Capacity for informed consent is a central concept in health care ethics and marks 
the line between people who can and cannot permissibly be subjected to involuntary 
treatment. Mental disorders can undermine a person’s capacity to consent but do not 
necessarily do so. In order to understand the relationship between mental disorders 
and capacity for consent we need to take a closer look at what is required for a per-
son to have this capacity.
4 This critique can also find support in declarations coming from relevant professional organizations. 
In the declaration of Hawaii, the World Psychiatrist Association states that “[n]o procedure shall be per-
formed nor treatment given against or independent of a patient’s own will, unless because of mental ill-
ness, the patient cannot form a judgement as to what is in his or her own best interest and without which 
treatment serious impairment is likely to occur to the patient or others” (WPA 1983, article 5). And in 
the next article we can read that “[a]s soon as the conditions for compulsory treatment no longer apply, 
the psychiatrist should release the patient from compulsory nature of the treatment and if further therapy 
is necessary should obtain voluntary consent.” (WPA 1983, article 6).
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According to one of the most influential models, the MacArthur Competence 
(Grisso and Appelbaum 1998), capacity for consent—or in their terminology, com-
petence to consent to treatment—consists of four abilities: understanding, apprecia-
tion, reasoning and ability to express choice. Understanding is the ability to compre-
hend information pertaining to the decision at hand, such as grasping the nature of 
the illness and treatment options, including non-treatment, and the possible conse-
quences of these. Appreciation is the ability to apply that information to one’s own 
person and circumstances. Reasoning is the ability to use that information in com-
bination with one’s preferences to form a decision. The ability to express a choice is 
precisely that, the ability to communicate the decision made.
Mental disorders can undermine all these abilities but the mere presence of men-
tal disorder does not by default undermine any of them, or at least does not under-
mine them to a degree that deprives a person of the capacity to consent. One exam-
ple of how a mental disorder can undermine one of the crucial abilities can be found 
in cases of anorexia nervosa. This disorder is characterized by the patient being 
severely underweight and suffering from a fear of gaining weight. Some people with 
anorexia suffer from a delusion-like belief that they are overweight. It is possible 
for a patient with anorexia to have extensive knowledge about nutrition and weight 
gain and loss as well as of general facts about weight in relation to the population at 
large. Yet they may fail to apply this information to their own situation or have an 
irrefutable belief that their general knowledge does not apply to their own case. Such 
a patient would fail to meet the appreciation condition.
The MacArthur competence can be compared with the conditions for men-
tal capacity in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) that applies in England and 
Wales. According to this act.
A person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable
a. to understand the information relevant to the decision,
b. to retain that information,
c. to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the deci-
sion, or
d. to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or 
any other means).
(Department of Health 2005: 2)
There are some differences between the two models,5 but it is the common features 
that are of importance here. First, capacity to consent is in both models tied to one 
5 The difference between the two models is their respective second condition. MacArthur competence 
requires a patient to be able to apply relevant information to their particular situation (appreciation) 
whereas the MCA explicitly demands the information to be “retained”. The MCA does not specify what 
retain means but notes that a person should not be regarded as lacking capacity if they can only retain 
information for short period of time. The appreciation aspect of the MacArthur competence can arguably 
be included in criterion (c) of the MCA model, while criterion (b) of this model is likely to be included 
in all the abilities of the MacArthur competence abilities except ability to express choice.
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specific decision. It is possible to have the capacity to make one particular decision 
but lack the capacity to make another. Likewise, it is possible to have the capacity 
to make a particular decision at one specific time but not another. The patient with 
anorexia described above could very well have the ability to appreciate information 
related to a decision regarding the removal of a tumour in her hand. Likewise, this 
patient could gain the ability to appreciate information related to the treatment of 
anorexia after having received therapy. Most importantly, due to this decision rela-
tivity, the fact that an offender has been declared “not guilty by reason of insanity” is 
no reason in itself to assume that this person lacks the capacity to consent to psychi-
atric care or to specific treatments within such care.
Second, none of the models require any particular cause for lack of capacity. Lack 
of capacity can be due to mental disorder, cognitive impairment, emotional distress 
or a physical injury (such as blood loss, a hit to the head, or any other cause that 
diminishes any of the required abilities).
Yet, the idea of using capacity to consent as a demarcation for when it is per-
missible to subject a patient to involuntary treatment has been met with criticism, 
most notably from the UN Committee on the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD). They argue that such tests are “discriminatorily applied to 
people with disabilities” and that they presume “to be able to accurately assess the 
inner-workings of the human mind”. The result of such tests is then used to deprive 
people of “a core human right—the right to equal recognition before the law” (Com-
mittee on CRPD 2014: 4).
The committee’s first argument that capacity conditions are discriminatory does 
not seem to be an argument against capacity conditions in principle or the capacity 
models discussed here. Rather it seems to be an argument against existing assess-
ment practices. The committee’s argument is best interpreted as an argument simi-
lar to the previously mentioned ethicists’ criticism based on the regulatory discrep-
ancy between the room for involuntary treatment in psychiatry and somatic health 
care. But to make that point, we need to assume the presence of an ethical standard 
of informed consent, which in turn requires the notion of capacity for consent and 
methods to assess such capacity.
The committee’s second argument seems far more problematic as we make 
assessments of each other’s mental states all the time and psychologists and other 
researchers have developed sophisticated methods for understanding how our psy-
chology works. The fact that capacity conditions may require us to assess the mental 
states of other people is no argument against this, albeit that it is a reason to be rig-
orous when making assessments.6
6 For a more thorough critique of the Committee’s comment on the CRPD see Martin et al. (2014).
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4  Dangerousness as a Reason to Limit the Right to Refuse Treatment
One reason for the involuntary psychiatric detention of psychiatric patients in 
general, and of offenders who have been exempted from criminal responsibility 
due to a successful insanity defence in particular, is their alleged dangerousness. 
Could the proposed change in legislation, that people suffering from a mental 
disorder should have a right to refuse care if they have capacity, deal with this 
alleged dangerousness?
First, it should be recognized that the group under discussion is small. It is 
very rare that people who suffer from mental disorders are acquitted of criminal 
responsibility. A review found that during 2002–2011 a total of 223 people in 
England and Wales were exempted from criminal responsibility on the grounds 
of insanity (Mackay 2012). A recent meta-analysis on studies made in the US 
of people freed from criminal responsibility by reason of insanity found that, 
even though the included studies showed some variation, on average the insanity 
defence succeeded in 25% of the rare instances when it was invoked. The meta-
analysis further showed that it was primarily disorders on the psychosis spec-
trum that lead to acquittal on grounds of insanity (Kois and Chauhan 2018). The 
crimes committed by offenders in England and Wales were predominantly violent 
crimes, such as assault, attempted murder, and arson. Successful murders only 
made up around a tenth of all attempts (Mackay 2012).
It might be argued that a person who suffers from a mental disorder that is 
severe enough to undermine criminal responsibility cannot at the same time 
have the capacity to refuse treatment. However, as argued in the previous sec-
tion, this assumption cannot be substantiated on a conceptual level, but it may of 
course be the case that, statistically, the two phenomena tend to come together. 
To my knowledge, no studies have been made of offenders exempt from criminal 
responsibility due to the influence of a mental disorder to see if they also have 
capacity to refuse treatment. However, some studies have been made concern-
ing capacity to consent or decision-making competence on psychiatric patients. 
When patients in psychiatric care are compared to patients in somatic care, the 
rate of patients with the capacity to consent to treatment is higher in somatic care, 
but in both types of care both patients with and without such capacity can be 
found (Owen et al. 2013). Mandarelli and colleagues (2014) have examined the 
decision-making competence of 60 patients in both voluntary and involuntary 
psychiatric care. They found that competence varied greatly within each group 
but that the patients in voluntary treatment in general had higher decision-making 
competence. The differences between the groups were particularly salient with 
regards to appreciation and reasoning. However, there were patients in the invol-
untary treatment group who scored high on the different competence abilities. In 
a study of 338 patients at psychiatric wards, Owen and colleagues (2008) found 
that approximately 60% (95% CI 55–65%) of the patients lacked decision-making 
competence. The share of patients who were decision-making competent varied 
with the diagnosis. People suffering from bipolar affective disorder-mania lacked 
competence to the highest degree followed by schizophrenia and other psychotic 
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disorders. A significantly larger part of patients suffering from depression and 
bipolar affective disorder-depression were found competent. The conclusions we 
can draw from these studies is that there are patients in involuntary treatment who 
meet the requirements for decision-making competence and thus have the capac-
ity to consent.
Even though the same mental disorders that tend to undermine criminal respon-
sibility also tend to undermine capacity to refuse treatment, there will always be 
room for offenders with mental disorders to have the capacity to refuse treatment. 
The reason for this is the decision-relative nature of both criminal responsibility and 
capacity to consent. The decision to commit a crime is different from a decision to 
refuse or consent to treatment. A person suffering from a compulsive mental disor-
der might have a perfectly adequate understanding of their condition and as such be 
able to competently make decisions about a possible treatment. Second, the decision 
to commit a criminal act is usually taken at another time than the decision to accept 
or refuse care. A person’s mental state may shift over time and, for example, the use 
of anti-psychotic medicine can re-establish a person’s capacity.
4.1  Previous Suggestions for Preventing Harm From People with Mental 
Disorders
A few scholars have addressed the ethical division of labour between criminal jus-
tice institutions and health care institutions when it comes to offenders suffering 
from mental disorders. However, these have suggested and discussed a number of 
proposals concerning how this group should be handled.
Tännsjö (1999) suggests what he calls a full responsibility model. He argues on 
consequentialist grounds that no exemption from criminal responsibility should be 
made for people even where the offence is due to a severe mental disorder. This 
strategy would nip the problem in its bud. However, as we saw earlier, prominent 
proponents of consequentialist justifications of the criminal penal system argue that 
the allocation of criminal responsibility should indeed emulate that of moral respon-
sibility. Tännsjö’s suggestion entails a violation of this contention, as it abandons the 
principle that only people who are guilty of committing a crime should be subject to 
criminal punishment.
Szmukler (2017), Dawson and Szmukler (2006), Szmukler, Daw and Dawson 
(2010) has repeatedly argued for what he calls fusion law:
a single, generic law governing treatment without consent that covers all 
patients, in all specialties, in all settings—medical, surgical, psychiatric, nurs-
ing and care homes, or indeed, anywhere in the community. (Szmukler 2017: 
86)
 According to this proposal, involuntary treatment should only be permissible when 
the patient does not have capacity to refuse treatment and the treatment is the least 
restrictive way of promoting the patient’s interests. However, Szmukler (2017) also 
acknowledges that some people who suffer from mental disorder pose a danger to 
other people. He therefore reluctantly suggests a compromise, that an exception 
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should be made for offenders who are found not guilty by reason of insanity and 
who have capacity to refuse care. Involuntary treatment of this group is, according 
to the fusion law compromise, permissible if there is an effective treatment avail-
able and that the time of the treatment lasts no longer than the prison sentence for 
the crime they were acquitted from. This solution is obviously unsatisfying as it 
goes against the principle underlying the fusion law, something that Szmukler also 
acknowledges. A further downside is that Szmukler’s exception does not satisfac-
torily handle the problem motivating him to sidestep the fusion law as the neces-
sary care might last for a longer time than the relevant prison sentence. Moreover, in 
some cases there may not exist any remedy but the need to protect the public would 
still be there.
A third way of dealing with dangerous offenders who suffer from mental disor-
ders could be preventive detention. Versions of this exist in many countries, such 
as Canada (Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 2009), Ger-
many (German Criminal Code 1998) and Norway (Straffeloven 2 kap. §39c). The 
idea underlying the practice of preventive detention is that if a person poses a threat 
to other people’s lives and safety then it is permissible to limit that person’s freedom 
if necessary. A parallel can be made to public health and the practice of putting peo-
ple who carry dangerous and contagious diseases in quarantine (cf. Douglas 2019). 
People who carry transmittable diseases might have done nothing wrong but it is 
still justifiable to isolate them under certain conditions to prevent the spread of the 
disease. Similarly, it would arguably be justifiable to put certain people in quarantine 
on the basis of their dangerousness, if the danger is imminent.
In order for preventive detention to be justified we must thus be able to determine 
how dangerous a person is to other people. Furthermore, we must also decide where 
to draw the line regarding how dangerous a person must be to become subject to 
preventive detention. A trade-off has to be made between promoting the value of 
protecting people from harm and the value attached to the individual’s freedom. We 
can note that in the case of the countries mentioned above at least one crime has to 
be committed by a person in order for preventive detention to apply.
How the trade-off is made is in part dependent on the degree to which we can 
actually predict future offences. There are a number of ways in which the risk a 
person poses to others can be assessed. In addition to unstructured clinical judg-
ments made by a psychiatrist or a psychologist, a number of formal tools have been 
developed such as HCR-20 and VRAG. A number of other more specific tools tar-
geting specific crimes and populations such as adolescents’ proneness to violence or 
risk for recidivist sexual offences are also being used. Additionally, tools such as the 
PCL-R that were not originally developed to predict risk are also being used for this 
purpose. The effectiveness of these tools to predict future criminal and violent activ-
ities varies considerably and any such tool may differ in predictive power for differ-
ent demographic groups (Singh et al. 2011). With these tools it is possible to make 
better predictions about the likelihood of future violence than mere chance would 
provide us with (SBU 2005) but they do not tell us how to weigh the opposing val-
ues. Especially regarding forensic psychiatric detention, the use of these kinds of 
risk assessment methods has been heavily criticized on both methodological and 
ethical grounds (Nilsson et al. 2009).
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One advantage of the basic idea of preventive detention is that it can be applied 
to all offenders whether they have a mental disorder or not. Only their assessed dan-
gerousness should be used as a ground for detaining them. There are some studies 
suggesting that mental illness is linked to violence, in particular schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder (Arseneault et al. 2000; Elbogen and Johnson 2009; Swanson et al. 
1990). However, this link between violence and mental disorder can to a great extent 
be explained by substance abuse (Elbogen and Johnson 2009; Fazel et  al. 2009; 
Fazel et al. 2010; Steadman et al. 1998; Swanson et al. 1990). Moreover, as many 
psychiatric diagnoses include the presence of independent risk factors (substance 
abuse, lack of impulse control and past norm-breaching behaviour, for instance), 
there is a risk that the recidivism risk of offenders suffering from mental disorders 
is unduly exaggerated (Nilsson et  al. 2009). It might be that future research will 
show that certain mental disorders increase the probability that a person will engage 
in violence. In that case, information about the relevant kinds of mental disorders 
should inform the risk assessment, but it will not provide a reason to treat mentally 
disordered offenders differently from criminals without such disorders.
Preventive detention is controversial as a means to protect people from harm 
since it seemingly imposes punitive measures on people in addition to the punish-
ment that has been judged appropriate as a societal response to their crimes. At 
the same time, some people pose a continuous threat to other people. If preventive 
detention is used, like in the legislative examples referred to here, the bar for when 
a person is subject to it will be high and some offenders who suffer from mental 
disorders will be considered dangerous but still not dangerous enough for preven-
tive detention to be warranted. I do not, here, wish to take a stand on whether or not 
preventive detention is justified but note that on its own it is unlikely to deal with the 
perceived danger of offenders with mental disorders, but it can work as a comple-
ment to Advance criminal responsibility, which I describe in the next section.
5  Prior Fault and Advance Criminal Responsibility
Not only people who suffer from mental disorders can find themselves in a situation 
in which they are not responsible for their actions. Such circumstances can for exam-
ple be brought about by temporary confusion, drugs and somatic illness. From the 
standpoint of the principle that criminal responsibility should emulate moral respon-
sibility, an important distinction in these cases is whether a person has brought about 
these states or not. This is often expressed in terms of a Prior Fault Rule, which 
exists in some form in most legal systems. If an offender, who is assessed as being 
not responsible due to a lack of understanding or control at the time of the crime, 
knowingly put themselves in this situation, they may in the end be held responsible. 
In the following I will suggest an extended application of this principle, which I will 
call Advance criminal responsibility. But first, consider the following two examples.
The Ruthless Criminal
A person sets out to commit assault. In order to become more violent and less 
compassionate the person takes Rohypnol in combination with alcohol before 
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doing the deed. Rohypnol also has the likely side-effect that the episode will 
be blurred in the perpetrator’s memory which will make a later interrogation 
harder (Dåderman and Lindberg 1999; Dåderman et  al. 2002). This ruthless 
criminal is, in this case, clearly morally responsible for the ensuing assault, 
and this assessment seems to be strengthened rather than weakened by the 
cynical preparations. This is so even if, at the time of the crime, the Rohypnol 
had rendered the ruthless criminal’s mental state such that, had it had not been 
caused by a prior fault, the perpetrator would not have been responsible.
The Back-Firing Spiked Drink
In addition to being used as an aggression and callousness enhancer, Rohyp-
nol is also used as a date-rape drug. In addition to causing hazy memories, 
it can cause a victim to lose the ability to resist what is happening to them 
(Dåderman and Lindberg 1999; Dåderman et al. 2002). However, in this case 
the use of Rohypnol backfires and the victim of the date-rape drug suffers a fit 
of rage and takes on the would-be rapist in a way that amounts to unlawful bat-
tery. The victim would probably not be held responsible for their actions when 
under the influence of Rohypnol since the drug severely diminishes their abil-
ity to control their aggressive impulses. Neither are they responsible for having 
brought themselves into that state, so there is no prior fault. The would-be rape 
victim would therefore not be morally responsible for the assault.
The situation of the spiked-drink victim is in many ways similar to that of people 
who commit crimes under the influence of mental disorders (or some other condi-
tion that potentially exempts them from criminal responsibility), in that they are not 
responsible for the mental states that reduce their capacity for responsibility. That a 
person suffers from a mental disorder is a result of a genetic disposition in conjunc-
tion with environmental factors that are to a large part outside the control of the per-
son. However, the actual circumstances in which people with mental disorders com-
mit crimes usually paint a more complex picture. Someone who commits a crime 
under the influence of a mental disorder is statistically likely to have had previous 
contact with psychiatric care (Kois and Chauhan 2018). The mental health problems 
and their nature is thus often known to the offender prior to the crime. This is espe-
cially true in cases where a person is re-offending. The idea underlying Advance 
criminal responsibility is that if a person knowingly enters into a state in which they 
know that they might pose a threat to other people by virtue of their mental disorder, 
and acting under the influence of that disorder would exempt that person from crimi-
nal responsibility, then the person is responsible for any actions committed under 
the influence of that mental disorder. A person who has the capacity to refuse care 
and who is aware of their mental disorder and the associated risks should, according 
to Advance criminal responsibility, be held responsible for any later crimes that the 
person commits under its influence. By refusing care they, so to speak, would take 
on criminal responsibility in advance.
Others (e.g. Law commission 2013; Mitchell 2003) have made a comparison 
between people with mental disorders who quit their medication (and hence do not 
follow the treating physician’s recommendation) and people who voluntarily get 
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intoxicated. They note that people who commit crimes while intoxicated are not 
exempt from criminal responsibility. Unlike the ruthless criminal in the previous 
example, people who suffer from mental disorders do not refuse treatment in order 
to commit crimes but rather in order to achieve some other end, such as avoiding 
unpleasant and sometimes severe side-effects of medication. Similarly, a person who 
commits a crime under the influence of a substance may, in contrast to the ruthless 
criminal, not use this substance in order to commit a crime but rather for some other 
end, such as enjoying the pleasant effects of the drug.
The fact that a person uses a drug with recreational intent is, however, not a 
reason to absolve that person from criminal responsibility should they commit a 
criminal act under its influence. For example, a person taking LSD may do so for 
the purpose of having a psychedelic experience but may have a bad trip, have ter-
rifying hallucinations and become violent and aggressive. That person would be in 
an altered state of mind that in other circumstances would exempt the person from 
criminal responsibility, but it does not do so in this case as they put themselves in 
the drug-induced state and were aware of the risks associated with drug use. In the 
same way, a person who suffers from hallucinations and is offered but refuses treat-
ment is responsible for being subject to those hallucinations.
Advance criminal responsibility may, further, be philosophically grounded in 
the distinction between option luck and brute luck, embraced across many camps in 
debates on moral responsibility.
Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—
whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she 
should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how 
risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles. (Dworkin 2000: 73)
Ronald Dworkin (2000) uses the example of insurance to explain this distinction. 
If a house is struck by lightning, this is a matter of bad brute luck. However, before 
the lightning strikes the house owner has an option whether or not to take out an 
insurance on the house. When lightning strikes it is good option luck to have taken 
out an insurance and bad option luck not to have done so. In the case at hand, a 
genetic disposition for mental disorder is a matter of brute luck, whereas the out-
come of the decision to refuse treatment is a matter of option luck. When the patient 
refuses treatment the person takes a deliberate decision to expose themselves to the 
risk of committing a crime for which they would not be criminally responsible if 
that act was just considered in isolation. Consenting to treatment is hence analogous 
to accepting an insurance against harming the people who would have been harmed 
by this crime, and insurances can be taken out even if the event it protects against is 
very unlikely, such as the event of lightning striking the house.
Advance criminal responsibility is the idea that a person takes on criminal 
responsibility for any later criminal acts done under the influence of a mental disor-
der when they refuse care (deemed necessary by a physician and/or a court) for their 
psychiatric problems. This suggestion hinges on two crucial features. First, that peo-
ple are responsible for refusing care and second that we can pinpoint disorders that, 
potentially, can exempt someone from responsibility. I will present a sketch of these 
two features in the next two sections.
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5.1  Responsibility Conditions and Refusal of Care
People with mental disorders who commit crimes exist at the intersection of health 
care and criminal justice institutions, but the specifics of this intersection are 
dependent on the precise nature of rules and practices pertaining to these institu-
tions. Even though I argue for a principled major change to these, it is still necessary 
when implementing such a change to pay attention to, and to respect, the legal sys-
tem and traditions of each individual country. This means that there will, in all like-
lihood, be differences in how this principled change is implemented and understood. 
However, there will be several problems, common to all systems, that need to be 
solved and delimitations that need to be done. I will try and sketch a few suggestions 
for how some of these problems can be handled while keeping in mind that different 
jurisdictions will have to meet these challenges in different ways.
The first problem concerns what conditions a person must meet in order to incur 
Advance criminal responsibility when refusing care. A reasonable suggestion is that 
the condition for criminal responsibility should be used for this purpose as well. One 
situation that we want to avoid is when a person has a right to refuse care but does 
not meet the conditions for criminal responsibility. That these two can come apart 
is what created the problem in the first place and Advance criminal responsibility 
is a suggestion to close that gap. It was previously argued that regardless of how 
the conditions for capacity to consent and the conditions for exempting someone 
from criminal responsibility are specified there will always be a set of people who 
will, after committing an unlawful act, fall outside the scope of the criminal justice 
system as well as that of administrative involuntary treatment. This is due to the fact 
that a decision to commit a criminal act and a decision to refuse care are two differ-
ent decisions made at different times. Hence, the assessments of criminal responsi-
bility and involuntary commitment are dependent on different aspects of a person’s 
mental capacities at different times. If someone is to incur Advance criminal respon-
sibility by refusing care, then the conditions for having a right to refuse care need 
to be identical to,7 or more stringent than, the conditions for criminal responsibility.
Starting from the conditions, already presented in this paper, for criminal respon-
sibility—M’Naghten rule and the Model Penal Code—and for capacity to consent—
MacArthur competence and the MCA—it is important to keep in mind that the con-
cepts at hand are institutional in the sense that they are being interpreted and used 
within certain institutions. Their meaning is thus, within certain limits, determined 
by their use in particular cases within their respective institutions. To compare 
actual usage of the conditions within these domains lies outside the scope of this 
paper. However, it is possible to examine the conditions and their wording as such.
7 This suggestion has been made by Juth and Lorentzon (2010). However, this would require a substan-
tial change in the conditions pertaining to criminal responsibility in most legal systems. Further, this 
solution requires that there are good, independent arguments for equating the two different sets of condi-
tions. The justification for exempting people with mental disorders from criminal responsibility is that 
they are not morally responsible for certain acts, while the justification for giving the right to refuse treat-
ment to people with mental disorders who have capacity to consent was to respect their autonomy and 
not unduly discriminate against them.
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There is a considerable overlap in phrases between the conditions for criminal 
responsibility and the conditions for capacity to consent. Understanding is a part 
of the M’Naghten rule, Model Penal Code, MacArthur competence and MCA. 
Appreciation, which is usually considered to be a stronger version of understanding, 
appears in both the Model Penal Code and MacArthur Competence.
Despite these similarities there are some differences between these domains. 
Both of the conditions for capacity to consent demand that a person needs to have 
the capacity for reasoning. This is not part of any condition for criminal responsibil-
ity (i.e. lack of capacity for reasoning is not in itself a ground for exempting a person 
from criminal responsibility in any rule). The conditions for capacity to consent are 
more stringent by virtue of this demand.
Both models for criminal responsibility refer to knowledge of right and wrong 
and might therefore seem more stringent than the two models for capacity to con-
sent. However, there are two problems with stating that conditions for criminal 
responsibility are more demanding because of this condition. First, capacity to 
consent assumes that all available alternatives, i.e. treatment and refusals, are legal 
options. The requirement that a person has a grasp of right and wrong in the crimi-
nal responsibility sense is irrelevant for capacity to consent. Second, in order to have 
capacity to consent a patient needs to have an understanding of the nature of their 
illness and the possible consequences of both treatment and refusal. Understanding 
that one’s mental disorder can put a person in a situation in which horrible deeds are 
done is one important consequence. Moreover, since mental disorders can contribute 
to the production of a number of different crimes it is necessary that a person, to 
have capacity to consent, understands this and also understands the nature of these 
crimes. Since this is complex information it will raise the bar for when a person is 
considered to have capacity to consent. This, in turn, will decrease the number of 
people who meet this threshold. Furthermore, the risk and nature of possible future 
crimes cannot fully be understood and definitely not appreciated unless the wrong-
ness of criminal acts are taken into account.8
If we compare the conditions for (exempting someone from) criminal responsi-
bility with the conditions for capacity to consent we see that a person might fall 
between the cracks if the Model Penal Code is combined with the Mental Capac-
ity Act 2005. The Model Penal Code requires that the offender can appreciate the 
wrongness of their act whereas the MCA only requires understanding. It is possible 
to consider appreciation to be an aspect of understanding but if this is not the case 
then the Model Penal Code is more stringent in this respect than the MCA and it 
is thus possible that someone might have capacity to consent but not be criminally 
responsible for their decision.
8 The notion of knowing that something is wrong is ambiguous as it can refer to law, personal morality, 
public morality or the moral truth (Sinnott-Armstrong and Levy 2011). I cannot here go into the impli-
cations of these different interpretations for the question at hand. Only the last of these interpretations, 
which is also the most controversial interpretation, is the hardest to reconcile when equating criminal 
responsibility and capacity to consent.
1 3
Criminal Law and Philosophy 
It is impossible to settle the issue on what the precise conditions for criminal 
responsibility and capacity to consent should be at this stage. The aim of the previ-
ous discussion has been to show that it is at least possible to construe conditions 
according to which capacity to consent entails criminal responsibility. When imple-
menting Advance criminal responsibility, attention needs to be paid to how these 
conditions relate to each other.
Given that we have been able to establish conditions for criminal responsibility 
and capacity to consent, someone needs to assess whether the person in question 
meets these conditions. Advance criminal responsibility should build upon present 
systems and be adapted to these. The decision that a person lacks capacity to con-
sent, or lacks criminal responsibility, are legal decisions. The latter is commonly 
decided by a criminal court, which is informed by a psychiatric evaluation. The for-
mer can be decided by a special judge, a court or a health care professional depend-
ing on the legislation and situation. Since the assessment of a person’s capacity is to 
be made in relation to a care situation, it seems appropriate that those who presently 
make decisions regarding involuntary treatment also assess capacity for criminal 
responsibility. Unlike certain acute medical situations that can arise regarding invol-
untary care,9 assessments of Advance criminal responsibility will not be done under 
the same time pressure and it might thus be advisable to have a psychiatrist making 
an evaluation that then informs the decision of whether a person has capacity to 
consent.
5.2  Future Offences and Mental Disorder
The second key feature of Advance criminal responsibility is that we must be able to 
pinpoint which psychiatric conditions might exempt a person from criminal respon-
sibility. At first glance, this seems fairly easy. It can be regarded as an empirical 
question. What we need to do is study cases in which people have been exempted 
from criminal responsibility and see what conditions these people suffered from at 
the time of the crime. Studies have found that the vast majority of people who are 
exempted from criminal responsibility suffer from some kind of psychotic or mood 
disorder (Crocker et al. 2015; Mackay and Kearns 1999; Mackay et al. 2006). How-
ever, there are also some conditions that occur in rare cases, such as PTSD (Mackay 
and Kearns 1999). If a person suffers from one of the conditions that may exempt 
them from criminal responsibility, and they refuse care for that condition, then that 
condition will not be a ground to exempt them from responsibility in the future.
However, there are two main problems with this approach. The first problem is 
that several people who commit crimes under the influence of mental disorders suf-
fer from multiple mental disorders, such as a combination of a substance abuse dis-
order and a psychotic disorder or the latter in combination with a personality dis-
order (Crocker et al. 2015). The second problem is that a person’s diagnosis might 
change over time.
9 An extreme acute situation could involve a patient in an uncontrollable fit of rage at the emergency 
department.
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If a person commits a crime under the influence of a mental disorder and is diag-
nosed with comorbid conditions, one of those diagnoses will be considered primary. 
In that case, one can assume that it is also this condition that is the main cause for 
the criminal act. Another approach could be a close examination of what role differ-
ent psychiatric conditions have, when an offender commits a crime under the influ-
ence of a mental disorder. Even though this is important from a legal standpoint it 
might be challenging to do in practice and it might also be difficult from a theoreti-
cal point of view since several conditions can contribute to a criminal act while only 
one of them is relevant from an exempting point of view. What one would need 
to do is to isolate the exempting condition from a cluster of psychological features 
that together led to the crime. An approach that seems promising for dealing with 
this problem is to view mental disorders as part of a causal condition for (criminal) 
acts and explore if such an isolation is possible through the use of available causal 
theories.10
The second problem is that diagnoses may vary over time and a person might 
receive a different diagnosis from different psychiatrists. This poses a problem for 
Advance criminal responsibility since it hinges on the stability of a person’s mental 
condition over time. If a person refuses treatment for one set of psychiatric diagno-
ses and then commits a crime and is determined by the forensic psychiatrist to suffer 
from a another set of psychiatric diagnoses, does the first refusal still transfer crimi-
nal responsibility? However, another strategy is possible. Instead of focusing on 
diagnoses one could focus on symptoms and functional impairments. These might 
be more stable over time and the differences in diagnoses can possibly be explained 
by different professionals relating these symptoms and functional impairments to 
different diagnoses (King and May 2018). This suggestion is also more in line with 
the general approach of focusing less on diagnoses and more on concrete problems.
Further research is necessary to determine which of these two strategies offers 
the most promising way of meeting this challenge. However, whichever of these 
strategies one chooses, two key aspects seem to be the same. First, regardless of 
whether one chooses a diagnosis-based or a symptom-based strategy, the assess-
ments of Advance criminal responsibility will be sensitive to the development of 
practice regarding assessments of criminal responsibility. New rulings might entail 
that new disorders, symptoms or combinations thereof may be grounds for exempt-
ing a person from criminal responsibility. New rulings may also exclude disorders, 
symptoms or combinations thereof from exempting a person from criminal responsi-
bility. Thus, there needs to be a feedback mechanism from the criminal courts to the 
institutions that make assessments of Advance criminal responsibility.
Second, since both diagnoses and symptoms can change over time, Advance 
criminal responsibility may need to be reassessed as the clinical status of the 
10 This has been suggested with regards to INUS-conditions (Anckarsäter et al. 2009): the presence of 
mental disorder would in that case, together with other factors be sufficient to make a person commit a 
crime. The mental illness would be a necessary part of a specific set of conditions which together brings 
about the crime. Other approaches, such as the explanation hypothesis, are also possible (Björnsson and 
Persson 2012).
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person changes. This would offer an individualized approach to reassessment. 
However, it should also be possible for individuals to change their minds. That 
a person has refused treatment at one point should not make the person Advance 
criminal responsible if they later consent to treatment. In that case they should 
be absolved from Advance criminal responsibility from the point of treatment. 
Likewise, a person who first consents to treatment but later decides to stop the 
treatment would then incur Advance criminal responsibility as they no longer 
are being treated for their disorder.
A further question might be raised concerning the scope of Advance criminal 
responsibility with respect to different crimes. Once again, this is something that 
must be decided in dialogue with the practice of the criminal justice institution. 
It is further an issue that cannot be settled within the scope of this paper. How-
ever, I will offer a general approach for how this problem could be dealt with.
In many jurisdictions people with epilepsy are subject to restrictions with 
respect to driving cars as a seizure would make them lose control over the car 
and consequently pose a threat to other people. If permitted to drive at all, 
requirements are made that no symptoms of epilepsy have been present for a 
number of years. This reasoning is not limited to driving cars but all activities in 
which losing control of one’s body would endanger other people, such as work-
ing heavy machinery in the presence of other people.
Mental disorders are different from epilepsy in several aspects, of which two 
are relevant here. First of all, in epilepsy it is the presence of symptoms that 
creates a threat to other people. A person with a mental disorder can have symp-
toms for a long time without posing a threat to other people. Second, epilep-
tic seizures make it impossible for a person to act as this requires control over 
one’s body whereas people with mental disorders can initiate action. M’Naghten 
for example was motivated by his delusions of a conspiracy against him to seek 
out and attempt to kill Robert Peel. However, regardless of these differences the 
common relevant feature of mental disorder and epilepsy is that the person in 
question is not responsible for what happens. Further, the requirement that peo-
ple with epilepsy are subject to strict limitations for when they are allowed to 
drive a car suggests that only a (very) low threshold of posing a threat to others 
needs to be met.
Further, it does not seem necessary to tie the mental disorder or symptom to 
a specific future crime. The insanity defence is foremost invoked in relation to 
violent crimes such as assault, murder, arson and so on. It is, however, impos-
sible to predict in which manner the mental disorder will express itself since 
that is bound to be influenced by the particular circumstances in which the act 
is performed. A parallel can here be drawn to people who commit crimes under 
the influence of drugs. Drugs can induce states that are in many ways similar to 
symptoms of a mental disorder, such as hallucinations and intense emotional 
states. That this is rare or can be unpredictable is not a reason to exempt people 
who commit crimes under the influence of drugs from criminal responsibility.
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5.3  The Status of Consent and Refusal
Being faced with the decision to refuse care and incur Advance criminal respon-
sibility or to consent to psychiatric treatment is not a favourable situation. It may 
even be argued that some patients do not have a genuine choice when offered 
health care because they cannot afford the treatment. Medical expenses are a 
problem for many people and in particular for people who commit crimes under 
the influence of mental disorders as they to a large extent are unemployed and 
have limited economic means (Kois and Chauhan 2018). Psychiatric treatment 
therefore needs to be affordable in order for it to be a genuine option. Further-
more, if Advance criminal responsibility is to be successfully implemented, treat-
ment must also be easily available since many people with psychiatric conditions 
might shy away from other people and, in part due to lack of economic resources, 
may find accessing appropriate care difficult. Therefore, psychiatric care also 
needs to be readily accessible.
Even if psychiatric care is available and affordable, the severe side-effects of 
some psychiatric medications provide good and understandable reasons for why a 
person would want to refuse care. Neither living with a mental disorder nor living 
with severe side-effects are appealing options; nevertheless, it is a decision that, in 
implementing Advance criminal responsibility, has to be made. As it is now, this 
decision is not in the hands of the patients but in the hands of health care institu-
tions. The proposed reform would mean a significant shift of power from health care 
institutions to patients. The side-effects of a particular medicine might be unbear-
able for a patient and because of this they might decide to refuse treatment, knowing 
that they, in addition to bearing their mental disorder, would incur Advance criminal 
responsibility. It is a hard choice but at least the choice would be theirs.
6  Conclusion
In this paper I have presented and argued in favour of a new approach for society 
to deal with dangerous people who suffer from mental disorders but who have the 
capacity to refuse care. The present-day standard regarding the involuntary treat-
ment of people with mental disorders should change so they cohere with the laws 
regulating somatic care. People who have the capacity to refuse care should have 
that capacity recognized and respected—regardless of whether they suffer from a 
mental disorder or not. If such a person suffering from a mental disorder refuses 
care for that disorder, or social support to manage it, knowing the stakes in terms of 
the risk of criminal behaviour, then they will, by virtue of the Prior Fault Rule, be 
responsible for any later act that is brought about by this refusal of care or support. 
If a person commits a crime during the first outbreak of a sufficiently serious mental 
disorder then that person should not be held criminally responsible since the crimi-
nal justice system should respect its central tenet that only those guilty of commit-
ting a crime should be subjected to punishment.
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